Firms and financial market structure
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When an acquisition informs rivals more than blockingWelfare relative to blocking, by the related firm's scale Working paper · New, November 2026
What an Acquisition Withholds: Verifiable Reports and the Social Value of a Listing
A listing makes a firm's information public; an acquisition gives it to the buyer alone. We ask when policy should prohibit or tax acquisitions for the sake of firms that learn from listings. Without verifiable disclosure, acquisitions can inform those firms more than prohibition does; precise enough verifiable disclosure reverses the ranking.
Draft coming soon
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A busier acquisition market raises the listing barListing share of exits rises with firm scale Working paper · New, November 2026
Waiting to Be Bought: The Acquisition Market and the Listing Decision
The U.S. public company count has roughly halved since the 1990s, with acquisitions a prominent correlate. We model a firm's choice between listing and waiting for a public buyer. The option to sell raises the listing cutoff, and because listed assets support acquirer capacity, acquisition-market tightness and listing are jointly determined.
Draft coming soon
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Produce past the peak, then cut back Working paper · New, November 2026
Optimal Forgetting: Information as Congestible Capital
An AI agent's notes grow with its findings and are searched by its later work. Past a peak, this capital congests its own use, and a smaller record can be worth strictly more. We characterize when optimal plans delete notes before capacity binds; live tests on two language-model agents show when early deletion pays.
Draft coming soon
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164 teams, one sample, wildly different answers The Journal of Finance, Volume 79, Issue 3, June 2024
Nonstandard Errors
Standard errors measure sampling uncertainty. We argue that variation in how researchers generate evidence adds uncertainty of its own: nonstandard errors. When 164 teams tested the same six hypotheses on the same sample, nonstandard errors were on par with standard errors, varied only weakly with team merits, fell after peer feedback, and were underestimated by participants.
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Trading speed across asset classesSpeed differences sort investors across venues Econometrica, Volume 86, Issue 3, May 2018
Competing on Speed
We model trading venues that invest in speed and compete for investors who choose where and how much to trade. Faster venues charge higher fees and attract speed-sensitive investors. Competition raises participation, volume and allocative efficiency, but entry and fragmentation can be excessive, speeds are generically inefficient, and trade-through rules increase fragmentation.
Selected presentations:AEA, WFA, SED, Cowles Foundation, FTG
- Project awarded with a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation
Read paperEconometricaBibTeX
@article{https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10762, author = {Pagnotta, Emiliano S. and Philippon, Thomas}, title = {Competing on Speed}, journal = {Econometrica}, volume = {86}, number = {3}, pages = {1067-1115}, year = {2018}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10762} } -
Volatility falls after mandatory central clearingVoluntary central clearing stayed near 1% of volume Working paper · Revise and resubmit, Journal of Financial Economics
Does Central Clearing Affect Price Stability? Evidence from Nordic Equity Markets
We study the 2009 reform that made central clearing mandatory in three Nordic equity markets. Relative to similar European stocks, volatility fell by 8.8% and volume by 11%, with no deterioration in trading costs or price informativeness. Given the option, investors had not cleared voluntarily, which points to a coordination role for policy.
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Fragmentation of trading across eleven exchanges, 2004–2012Price protection lowers asset prices Working paper
Speed, Fragmentation, and Asset Prices
We study how trading speed and fragmentation affect liquidity and asset prices. In a consolidated market, speed investments raise liquidity and prices; when markets fragment, liquidity and prices can move in opposite directions. Rules that protect execution prices, such as the SEC's trade-through rule, can lower price levels and trading volume, an unintended cost for public corporations.
Selected presentations:RED Fragmentation Conference, AFA, WFA, SFS Cavalcade