What an Acquisition Withholds: Verifiable Reports and the Social Value of a Listing

Emiliano S. Pagnotta

Working paper, November 2026 Part of Firms and financial market structure

Draft coming soon

Abstract

When a private firm lists, it makes information about its fundamentals public, and firms whose fundamentals move with its own use it to allocate capital. An acquisition gives the information to the buyer alone. We ask when policy should prohibit or tax acquisitions for these related firms' sake. At zero taxes, one more acquisition beyond the buyer's optimal offer raises welfare apart from related firms, so restraint at the margin rests on what they learn. With listings untaxed and no underwriting spread, what they learn turns on whether what a listing discloses is verifiable, and how precise it is. Without verifiable disclosure, related firms observe only which exit the firm takes, and acquiring exactly the firms that would otherwise list informs them more than prohibition, by separating firms that prohibition pools. With verifiable disclosure, coarse enough disclosure keeps that gain, while precise enough disclosure makes almost every firm list under prohibition, disclosing what an acquisition withholds. Given any positive share of private firms acquired, precise enough disclosure makes prohibition inform related firms more than every finite-cutoff acquisition of at least that share. Once related firms matter enough, each comparison ranks welfare. Implications concern acquisition policy, disclosure rules and listing costs.

Cite

Emiliano S. Pagnotta (2026). "What an Acquisition Withholds: Verifiable Reports and the Social Value of a Listing." Working paper.