Research
My research focus is on how liquidity and information impact financial markets and the economy at large.
Digital money and assets
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Block capacity, the fee and the price of bitcoinBitcoin price and average transaction fee, 2015–2025Two security equilibria under mixed financing Working paper · New version, October 2026
A General-Equilibrium Theory of Issuerless Money: Capacity, Fees, and Self-Financed Security
Bitcoin is money without an issuer. We model its general equilibrium: money's value, the fee for capped block space and chain security are jointly determined. Block size becomes a monetary instrument; once the subsidy ends, a fee-only chain survives only at intermediate sizes; and the price–fee co-movement identifies whether demand uses block space.
New version coming soon
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Bitcoin's price and hashrate, 2010–2020Price and security: multiple monetary equilibria The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 35, Issue 2, February 2022
Decentralizing Money: Bitcoin Prices and Blockchain Security
We study what determines bitcoin's price and the security of its blockchain. Users price the risk of attacks, and miners commit resources against attackers in return for block rewards. The same technology supports equilibria with sharply different prices and security, and price–security feedback amplifies shocks, producing booms and busts unconnected to fundamentals.
Selected presentations:AEA, WFA, FIRS, EFA
- Winner of the Best Cryptoeconomics Paper Award at the 2nd Toronto Fintech Conference
Read paperReview of Financial StudiesBibTeX
@article{10.1093/rfs/hhaa149, author = {Pagnotta, Emiliano S}, title = {Decentralizing Money: Bitcoin Prices and Blockchain Security}, journal = {The Review of Financial Studies}, volume = {35}, number = {2}, pages = {866-907}, year = {2022}, month = {02}, doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhaa149}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa149} } -
The price–hashrate spiral Working paper
An Equilibrium Valuation of Bitcoin and Decentralized Network Assets
We value bitcoin and other blockchain tokens in a decentralized network economy, where the miners who secure the network are paid in the same asset that users demand. This “unity” property makes the hashrate and the price jointly determined and induces price–hashrate spirals that amplify demand and supply shocks relative to traditional assets.
Selected presentations:AFA, NBER Asset Pricing Summer Institute, Finance Theory Group
Informed trading
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Information flow into prices, all insider-trading eventsInsiders bet less as penalties risePenalties scale with traders' profits The Journal of Finance, Volume 79, Issue 1, February 2024
Legal Risk and Insider Trading
Do illegal insiders internalize legal risk? Using hand-collected data from 530 SEC investigations and two plausibly exogenous shocks to penalties, we show that insiders facing higher risk trade less aggressively and earlier, and concentrate on more valuable tips. The findings support the deterrent effect of U.S. regulation and the hypothesis that enforcement can hamper price informativeness.
Selected presentations:AFA, SFS Cavalcade, NBER Summer Institute, EFA
Read paperJournal of FinanceHarvard Law School PostBibTeX
@article{https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13299, author = {KACPERCZYK, MARCIN and PAGNOTTA, EMILIANO S.}, title = {Legal Risk and Insider Trading}, journal = {The Journal of Finance}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {305-355}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13299}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jofi.13299}, year = {2024} } -
Informed trading days are more liquid, not lessIn the model, spreads fall faster on private-news days The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 32, Issue 12, December 2019
Chasing Private Information
Using over 5,000 trades based on nonpublic information, we find that informed-trading days show abnormally high volatility and volume and low illiquidity in equity and option markets, while bid-ask spreads fall. Market makers' learning under event uncertainty and informed traders' limit orders help explain these patterns; informed traders pick days with high uninformed volume.
Selected presentations:WFA, NBER LTAM, NBER Asset Pricing SI, FIRS, SED
Read paperReview of Financial StudiesBibTeX
@article{10.1093/rfs/hhz029, author = {Kacperczyk, Marcin and Pagnotta, Emiliano S}, title = {Chasing Private Information}, journal = {The Review of Financial Studies}, volume = {32}, number = {12}, pages = {4997-5047}, year = {2019}, month = {12}, doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhz029}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz029} } -
Order submission intensities of informed and liquidity traders Working paper
Information and Liquidity Trading at Optimal Frequencies
We study a market where, as on major exchanges, informed and liquidity investors continuously choose when to trade and whether to take or provide liquidity. Investors demand and supply liquidity at once, in time-varying patterns seen in experiments. Information travels faster in limit-order than in dealer markets, and proprietary NYSE data support the model's predictions for liquidity provision.
Firms and financial market structure
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When an acquisition informs rivals more than blockingWelfare relative to blocking, by the related firm's scale Working paper · New, November 2026
What an Acquisition Withholds: Verifiable Reports and the Social Value of a Listing
A listing makes a firm's information public; an acquisition gives it to the buyer alone. We ask when policy should prohibit or tax acquisitions for the sake of firms that learn from listings. Without verifiable disclosure, acquisitions can inform those firms more than prohibition does; precise enough verifiable disclosure reverses the ranking.
Draft coming soon
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A busier acquisition market raises the listing barListing share of exits rises with firm scale Working paper · New, November 2026
Waiting to Be Bought: The Acquisition Market and the Listing Decision
The U.S. public company count has roughly halved since the 1990s, with acquisitions a prominent correlate. We model a firm's choice between listing and waiting for a public buyer. The option to sell raises the listing cutoff, and because listed assets support acquirer capacity, acquisition-market tightness and listing are jointly determined.
Draft coming soon
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Produce past the peak, then cut back Working paper · New, November 2026
Optimal Forgetting: Information as Congestible Capital
An AI agent's notes grow with its findings and are searched by its later work. Past a peak, this capital congests its own use, and a smaller record can be worth strictly more. We characterize when optimal plans delete notes before capacity binds; live tests on two language-model agents show when early deletion pays.
Draft coming soon
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164 teams, one sample, wildly different answers The Journal of Finance, Volume 79, Issue 3, June 2024
Nonstandard Errors
Standard errors measure sampling uncertainty. We argue that variation in how researchers generate evidence adds uncertainty of its own: nonstandard errors. When 164 teams tested the same six hypotheses on the same sample, nonstandard errors were on par with standard errors, varied only weakly with team merits, fell after peer feedback, and were underestimated by participants.
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Trading speed across asset classesSpeed differences sort investors across venues Econometrica, Volume 86, Issue 3, May 2018
Competing on Speed
We model trading venues that invest in speed and compete for investors who choose where and how much to trade. Faster venues charge higher fees and attract speed-sensitive investors. Competition raises participation, volume and allocative efficiency, but entry and fragmentation can be excessive, speeds are generically inefficient, and trade-through rules increase fragmentation.
Selected presentations:AEA, WFA, SED, Cowles Foundation, FTG
- Project awarded with a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation
Read paperEconometricaBibTeX
@article{https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10762, author = {Pagnotta, Emiliano S. and Philippon, Thomas}, title = {Competing on Speed}, journal = {Econometrica}, volume = {86}, number = {3}, pages = {1067-1115}, year = {2018}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10762} } -
Volatility falls after mandatory central clearingVoluntary central clearing stayed near 1% of volume Working paper · Revise and resubmit, Journal of Financial Economics
Does Central Clearing Affect Price Stability? Evidence from Nordic Equity Markets
We study the 2009 reform that made central clearing mandatory in three Nordic equity markets. Relative to similar European stocks, volatility fell by 8.8% and volume by 11%, with no deterioration in trading costs or price informativeness. Given the option, investors had not cleared voluntarily, which points to a coordination role for policy.
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Fragmentation of trading across eleven exchanges, 2004–2012Price protection lowers asset prices Working paper
Speed, Fragmentation, and Asset Prices
We study how trading speed and fragmentation affect liquidity and asset prices. In a consolidated market, speed investments raise liquidity and prices; when markets fragment, liquidity and prices can move in opposite directions. Rules that protect execution prices, such as the SEC's trade-through rule, can lower price levels and trading volume, an unintended cost for public corporations.
Selected presentations:RED Fragmentation Conference, AFA, WFA, SFS Cavalcade
Other writing
- Comment to the SEC on Reg NMS Rule 611Policy comment, April 2015
- Speed Competition and Fragmentation in Financial MarketsCenter for the Study of Financial Regulation, University of Notre Dame, Fall 2012
- Dilemas de la Política Comercial Externa Argentinawith Roberto BouzasSiglo XXI, 2003