Competing on Speed
Econometrica, 2018 Part of Firms and financial market structure
- Project awarded with a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation
Abstract
We analyze trading speed and fragmentation in asset markets. In our model, trading venues make technological investments and compete for investors who choose where and how much to trade. Faster venues charge higher fees and attract speed-sensitive investors. Competition among venues increases investor participation, trading volume, and allocative efficiency, but entry and fragmentation can be excessive, and speeds are generically inefficient. Regulations that protect transaction prices (e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission trade-through rule) lead to greater fragmentation. Our model sheds light on the experience of European and U.S. markets since the implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation National Markets System.
Notes
NBER Working Paper 17652
Online Appendix: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2047536
Cite
Emiliano S. Pagnotta and Thomas Philippon (2018). "Competing on Speed." Econometrica 86(3): 1067–1115.
@article{https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10762,
author = {Pagnotta, Emiliano S. and Philippon, Thomas},
title = {Competing on Speed},
journal = {Econometrica},
volume = {86},
number = {3},
pages = {1067-1115},
year = {2018},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10762}
} Presentations
AEA, WFA, SED, Cowles Foundation, FTG
- 2011–2012 Cowles Foundation General Equilibrium Conference, Yale U.