Informed trading
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Information flow into prices, all insider-trading eventsInsiders bet less as penalties risePenalties scale with traders' profits The Journal of Finance, Volume 79, Issue 1, February 2024
Legal Risk and Insider Trading
Do illegal insiders internalize legal risk? Using hand-collected data from 530 SEC investigations and two plausibly exogenous shocks to penalties, we show that insiders facing higher risk trade less aggressively and earlier, and concentrate on more valuable tips. The findings support the deterrent effect of U.S. regulation and the hypothesis that enforcement can hamper price informativeness.
Selected presentations:AFA, SFS Cavalcade, NBER Summer Institute, EFA
Read paperJournal of FinanceHarvard Law School PostBibTeX
@article{https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13299, author = {KACPERCZYK, MARCIN and PAGNOTTA, EMILIANO S.}, title = {Legal Risk and Insider Trading}, journal = {The Journal of Finance}, volume = {79}, number = {1}, pages = {305-355}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13299}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jofi.13299}, year = {2024} } -
Informed trading days are more liquid, not lessIn the model, spreads fall faster on private-news days The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 32, Issue 12, December 2019
Chasing Private Information
Using over 5,000 trades based on nonpublic information, we find that informed-trading days show abnormally high volatility and volume and low illiquidity in equity and option markets, while bid-ask spreads fall. Market makers' learning under event uncertainty and informed traders' limit orders help explain these patterns; informed traders pick days with high uninformed volume.
Selected presentations:WFA, NBER LTAM, NBER Asset Pricing SI, FIRS, SED
Read paperReview of Financial StudiesBibTeX
@article{10.1093/rfs/hhz029, author = {Kacperczyk, Marcin and Pagnotta, Emiliano S}, title = {Chasing Private Information}, journal = {The Review of Financial Studies}, volume = {32}, number = {12}, pages = {4997-5047}, year = {2019}, month = {12}, doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhz029}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz029} } -
Order submission intensities of informed and liquidity traders Working paper
Information and Liquidity Trading at Optimal Frequencies
We study a market where, as on major exchanges, informed and liquidity investors continuously choose when to trade and whether to take or provide liquidity. Investors demand and supply liquidity at once, in time-varying patterns seen in experiments. Information travels faster in limit-order than in dealer markets, and proprietary NYSE data support the model's predictions for liquidity provision.