Legal Risk and Insider Trading
Journal of Finance, 2024 Part of Informed trading
Previously circulated as Becker Meets Kyle: Legal Risk and Insider Trading and Inside Insider Trading.
Abstract
Do illegal insiders internalize legal risk? We address this question with hand-collected data from 530 SEC (the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) investigations. Using two plausibly exogenous shocks to expected penalties, we show that insiders trade less aggressively and earlier and concentrate on tips of greater value when facing a higher risk. The results match the predictions of a model where an insider internalizes the impact of trades on prices and the likelihood of prosecution and anticipates penalties in proportion to trade profits. Our findings lend support to the effectiveness of U.S. regulations' deterrence and the long-standing hypothesis that insider trading enforcement can hamper price informativeness.
Cite
Marcin Kacperczyk and Emiliano S. Pagnotta (2024). "Legal Risk and Insider Trading." The Journal of Finance 79(1): 305–355.
@article{https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13299,
author = {KACPERCZYK, MARCIN and PAGNOTTA, EMILIANO S.},
title = {Legal Risk and Insider Trading},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
volume = {79},
number = {1},
pages = {305-355},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13299},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jofi.13299},
year = {2024}
} Presentations
AFA, SFS Cavalcade, NBER Summer Institute, EFA
- Dec 2021 Market Microstructure Online Seminars-Asia Pacific
- 2020–2021 FIRS Conference
- 2021–2023 Western Finance Association (WFA)
- 2019–2020 American Financial Association (AFA), San Diego
- 2019–2020 Duke-UNC Asset Pricing Conference
- 22 May 2019 Society of Financial Studies (SFS) Cavalcade, Pittsburgh
- 23 Aug 2018 European Financial Association (EFA), Warsaw
- 25 Jul 2018 NBER Summer Institute, Economics of Crime